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Abstract
Background: Due to the uncommon nature of large-scale disasters and emergencies, public health practitioners
often turn to simulated emergencies, known as “exercises”, for preparedness assessment and improvement. Under
the right conditions, exercises can also be used to conduct original public health systems research. This paper
describes the integration of a research framework into a statewide operations-based exercise program in California
as a systems-based approach for studying public health emergency preparedness and response.
Methods: We developed a research framework based on the premise that operations-based exercises conducted
by medical and public health agencies can be described using epidemiologic concepts. Using this framework, we
conducted a survey of key local and regional medical and health agencies throughout California following the 2010
Statewide Medical and Health Exercise. The survey evaluated: (1) the emergency preparedness capabilities activated
and functions performed in response to the emergency scenario, and (2) the major challenges to
inter-organizational communications and information management.
Results: Thirty-five local health departments (LHDs), 24 local emergency medical services (EMS) agencies,
121 hospitals, and 5 Regional Disaster Medical and Health Coordinators/Specialists (RDMHC) responded to our
survey, representing 57%, 77%, 26% and 83%, respectively, of target agencies in California. We found two sets of
response capabilities were activated during the 2010 Statewide Exercise: a set of core capabilities that were
common across all agencies, and a set of agency-specific capabilities that were more common among certain
agency types. With respect to one response capability in particular, inter-organizational information sharing,
we found that the majority of respondents’ comments were related to the complete or partial failure of
communications equipment or systems.
Conclusions: Using the 2010 Statewide Exercise in California as an opportunity to develop our research framework,
we characterized several aspects of the public health and medical system’s response to a standardized emergency
scenario. From a research perspective, this study provides a potential new framework for conducting exercise-based
research. From a practitioner’s perspective, our results provide a starting point for preparedness professionals’
dialogue about expected and actual organizational roles, responsibilities, and resource capacities within the public
health system. Additionally, the identification of specific challenges to inter-organizational communications and
information management offer specific areas for intervention.
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The infrequent nature of large-scale public health emer-
gencies is often cited as a barrier to preparedness evalu-
ation and improvement. With few events, researchers
have limited use of statistical methods to test hypotheses
and to identify predictors of effective response out-
comes—the characteristics of public health systems that
result in the fewest number of adverse health outcomes
at the least cost to society [1]. Public health practitioners
increasingly rely on simulated emergencies, known as
“exercises”, for preparedness assessment and improve-
ment. Exercises routinely play an important role in
building and testing emergency response capabilities [2].
Under the right conditions, they can also be used to
conduct original public health systems research, func-
tioning as “epidemiologic laboratories” where partici-
pants are exposed to scenarios and injects that can
answer high-priority, all-hazards preparedness and re-
sponse research questions.
Although exercises have frequently served as a plat-
form for studying public health emergency preparedness
(e.g. [3-5]), the potential for exercise-based research to
produce generalizable evidence in emergency prepared-
ness has not been fully realized. There are several pos-
sible reasons for the under-utilization of this resource.
First, there are currently no well-defined, universal stan-
dards for public health emergency preparedness, limiting
our ability to compare agency or system performance
with a recognized benchmark or metric [6]. As a result,
findings from exercise-based research have generally
been limited to summaries of strengths and limitations
experienced by participants. Second, to realistically test
preparedness systems, it is necessary to conduct
operations-based exercises, during which participants
actually respond to the simulated emergency [7].
a How-
ever, due to the resource-intensive nature of developing
and conducting this type of exercise, researchers either:
(1) rely on more common and less costly discussion-
based exercises, which are useful for identifying emer-
gency preparedness gaps and vulnerabilities but do not
directly test the preparedness system [8], (2) evaluate
exercises with a limited number of participating jurisdic-
tions, restricting the generalizability of research findings
and lessons for systems improvement [3], or (3) aggre-
gate data from multiple exercises with various scenarios
in order to assess common themes and challenges [4,5].
In this paper, we describe the integration of a research
framework to a statewide functional exercise in Califor-
nia. By leveraging the pre-existing statewide exercise
program, we were able to access a relatively large num-
ber of medical and health agencies at a low cost, allow-
ing us to gain a broader view of how public health
systems in California operate in response to a single
scenario.
Statewide exercise
The Medical and Health Exercise (hereafter referred to
as the “Statewide Exercise”) is one of two annual emer-
gency preparedness exercises coordinated at the state
level in California. During this multi-level, multi-agency
exercise, all 58 operational areas
b and 6 regional offices
in California are invited to participate in functional exer-
cises in collaboration with state agencies using a single
common emergency scenario [9]. Each operational area
designs and conducts the exercise to suit its own pre-
paredness goals and objectives, either conducting the ex-
ercise independently or in collaboration with other
jurisdictions. Although exercise participation varies
among operational areas, certain agencies such as hospi-
tals, public health departments and emergency medical
services (EMS) agencies are incentivised to participate to
meet grant or regulatory requirements.
The 2010 exercise scenario involved a series of explo-
sions throughout the state resulting from the detonation
of improvised explosive devices (IED).
c While each oper-
ational area was expected to tailor their exercise to meet
their own needs, all participants were encouraged to use
the exercise to activate capabilities related to communi-
cations, information sharing, and medical surge in re-
sponse to bomb threats, explosions, and multiple
casualties. A common exercise guidebook was developed
by state agencies to aid in the coordination of scenario
development [10]. Using this as an opportunity to de-
velop our research framework, we distributed a post-
exercise survey and conducted a mixed-methods study
of two research questions:
1. Which emergency preparedness capabilities were
activated by entities in the medical and health system
in response to the exercise scenario?
2. What were the major challenges to
inter-organizational communications and
information sharing?
The primary aim of this paper is to describe the
process of conducting research using statewide exercises.
By presenting the results of two example research ques-
tions, we illustrate the type of data that can be collected
using this approach, and highlight the opportunities and
challenges for future research.
Methods
An epidemiologic exercise model
Our research framework is based on the premise that
operations-based exercises can be described using epide-
miologic concepts (Figure 1). As a first step in actualiz-
ing the research framework, we used a simplified version
of this model, represented by the letters a, b and c. The
exercise scenario (denoted by a) constitutes the system
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exercise injects. Upon receipt of the perturbation and
injects, the exercise participants or agencies (denoted by
b) perform actions (responses or intermediate out-
comes, denoted by c) that directly or indirectly result
in final outcomes, such as injury, disease, disability,
and death.
Using the epidemiologic exercise model (Figure 1) as a
guide, various types of study designs (randomized con-
trolled trial, cross-sectional, etc.) can be implemented in
the right exercise setting. The research possibilities are
enormous and have not yet been fully tapped. To pro-
vide an example, we describe our method of studying
two research priorities identified by our practice-based
Steering Committee, which is composed of decision-
makers in state and local public health and medical
agencies. The intent of engaging a practice-based Steer-
ing Committee was to develop research priorities and
questions relevant to practice, and to facilitate research
translation into policy or practice [11].
Study design and instrument
Using a cross-sectional study design, we conducted a
web-based survey to evaluate four domains related to
the Statewide Exercise. The two described in this paper
are: (1) organizational capabilities and functions and
(2) challenges to inter-organizational communications
and information sharing. In the context of our epidemio-
logic exercise model, these domains represent two ways
of characterizing of response activities, which are con-
ceptualized as intermediate outcomes in the causal path-
way from the exercise perturbation event to final
outcomes (Figure 1).
Throughout its development, the survey instrument
was periodically reviewed by the Steering Committee
and pilot-tested by representatives from participating
organizations. Subsequent modifications were made
based on this feedback.
Measurements
Capabilities and functions
As a proxy measure of organizational roles and responsi-
bilities assumed during a response—areas previously
identified as requiring further research and improvement
[1]—we assessed the capabilities and functions activated
by public health and medical agencies during the State-
wide Exercise. Standard response capabilities and func-
tions were introduced by the Department of Homeland
Security Target Capabilities List, which defines activities
and tasks that form the basis of performance metrics and
benchmark criteria to assess preparedness levels [12]. The
term capability refers to the ability to perform functions
or activities necessary for an effective response to major
disasters and emergencies. Survey respondents were asked
to indicate whether persons in their organization were
assigned to functions related to each of 33 capabilities.
Common capabilities were excluded from the survey,
since they are cross-cutting and expected to be engaged in
every response. Psychological support was added based on
researchers’ interests.
Inter-organizational communications & information sharing
challenges
To identify challenges to inter-organizational communi-
cations and information sharing, the survey included two
questions. The first was a subjective and open-ended
question, asking respondents to describe their most sig-
nificant communications challenge during the exercise.
The second instructed respondents to select the types
of communication challenges their organization ex-
perienced from a list of options that was developed
Figure 1 Epidemiologic Exercise Model. Figure 1 shows an operations-based exercise that can form the basis of a variety of study designs,
such as a retrospective or prospective observational study. Sections labelled with a, b, and c indicate the simplified version of the model we used
as a first step in actualizing the research framework. Notice that both the exercise scenario (perturbation) and/or injects can be randomly
allocated to participants in order to conduct a randomized controlled trial.
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experiences.
Exercise participation
Survey respondents were also asked about the types of
exercises conducted during the 2010 Statewide Exercise,
characteristics of participating agencies, and factors in-
fluencing exercise participation. This information has
been published elsewhere [13].
Study population
To evaluate California’s medical and public health sys-
tem during the Statewide Exercise, representatives from
all local health departments (LHDs; n=61), local EMS
agencies (n=31), and Regional Disaster Medical and
Health Coordinator/Specialists (RDMHC; n=6) were
invited to participate in the post-exercise survey. Since
contact information for hospital preparedness staff is not
publicly available, we relied on the assistance of the Cali-
fornia Hospital Association (CHA) to recruit all general
acute care hospitals (n=466) in California, which com-
prise 87% of all licensed hospitals in the state (n=534).
During a one-month data collection period following
the Statewide Exercise, survey invitations and three sub-
sequent reminders were emailed using a web-based sys-
tem (Qualtrics
©). Survey recipients were chosen based
on their functional role in their organization: health offi-
cers for LHDs, administrators for local EMS agencies,
and preparedness coordinators for hospitals. Whereas
government agency representatives directly received
invitations and reminders from the Principal Investigator,
hospitals received such communications as a forwarded
message from CHA.
Data management and analyses
Survey data were restricted by date range and analyzed
using Stata 11 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX). The
response rate was calculated after limiting the dataset to
respondents who partially or fully completed the survey,
and removing duplicate responses—the result of having
multiple respondents from the same organization or
from the same region, in the case of respondents who
were RDMHC. When duplicate responses were found,
researchers used a pre-determined prioritization scheme
based on survey completion status and target functional
role for an agency type (e.g., health officers were the
intended functional role for LHDs) to determine which
response to include.
Agency classification
We used survey respondents’ self-designation to clas-
sify agency types. Five types of respondents emerged—
those who declared an affiliation with: (1) LHDs, (2)
local EMS agencies, (3) LHDs and local EMS agencies,
(4) hospitals, and (5) RDMHC. Follow-up interviews were
conducted with respondents who identified an affiliation
with both LHDs and EMS agencies, all of whom affirmed
their responses reflected both agencies’ experiences during
the exercise. Since these respondents were affiliated with
agencies legally recognized as local EMS agencies that op-
erate within a LHD (California Health and Safety Code
Section 1797.200), this category is hereafter referred to as
“local EMS agency within a LHD.”
d
Quantitative analysis
For both research questions, analysis was restricted to
data from respondents who met the following criteria:
(1) partially or fully completed the survey, (2) indicated
their agency participated in the Statewide Exercise using
the common scenario, and (3) indicated their agency
carried out an operations-based exercise.
In order to characterize the capabilities and functions
activated in response to the exercise scenario, we used
the frequency of reported activation to find the average
number and range of capabilities for each agency type.
Capabilities that were commonly activated for all agency
types, as well as those characteristic of a specific agency
type, were identified via graphical response profiles
(Figure 2).
Qualitative analysis
Qualitative data were independently coded by two
researchers (JH, MP) to classify statements into themes,
categories, and sub-categories. All coding discrepancies
were resolved. Descriptive summaries of themes are
provided and supplemented by illustrative quotes (see
Additional file 1). These analyses were further informed
by direct observation of the exercise by researchers.
This research was approved by the Committee for Pro-
tection of Human Subjects at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley.
Results
In the following section, we summarize the results of
two example questions in effort to demonstrate the type
of data that can be collected using this research frame-
work and to underscore potential challenges and oppor-
tunities that may arise using this approach. Detailed
results for both research questions can be found in
Additional file 1.
Respondent and organizational demographics
Our study sample includes 174 respondents who repre-
sent 35 LHDs, 24 local EMS agencies, 121 hospitals, and
5 RDMHC in the state, giving response rates of 57%,
77%, 26% and 83%, respectively
e,f. Of 174 respondents,
144 met the inclusion criteria for analysis of the
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Legend – Key Functions
1 Medical Surge 18 Mental health/Psychological Support
2 Medical Supplies Management and Distribution 19 Explosive Device Response Operations
3
Intelligence Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and 
Warnings 20
WMD and Hazardous Materials Response and 
Decontamination
4 Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 21 Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
5 Emergency Public Information and Warning 22 Mass Prophylaxis
6 Emergency Operations Center Management 23 Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services)
7 Volunteer Management and Donations 24 Economic and Community Recovery
8 Fatality Management 25 Other
9 On-Site Incident Management 26 Counter-Terror Investigation and Law Enforcement
10 Responder Safety and Health  27 Critical Infrastructure Protection
11 Environmental Health 28 Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
12 Isolation and Quarantine 29 Laboratory Testing
13 Emergency Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment 30 Animal Disease Emergency Support
14 Intelligence Analysis and Production 31 Fire Incident Response Support
15 Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation 32 Search and Rescue (Land-Based)
16 Emergency Public Safety and Security 33 Structural Damage Assessment
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CBRNE Detection (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
Explosive) 34 Restoration of Lifelines
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Figure 2 (See legend on next page.)
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LHDs, 21 local EMS agencies, 103 hospitals, and 5
RDMHC, which constitute 49%, 68%, 19% and 83%, re-
spectively, of the target populations.
g
The final sample includes responses from agencies
located in 46 of the 58 counties in California (79%). All
six Mutual Aid Regions were represented by responding
LHDs, local EMS agencies, and RDMHC (at least 35% of
agencies in each Region responded). The most common
functional roles of respondents were health officers or
health directors (39% of LHDs), preparedness coordina-
tors (50% of LHDs, 33% of local EMS agencies, 42% of
local EMS agencies within a LHD, and 90% of hospitals),
and administrators (44% of local EMS agencies and 92%
of local EMS agencies within a LHD).
To assess the representativeness of our research sam-
ple, we compared key demographic characteristics of
counties from which we received responses to counties
that did not respond (Table 1). T-tests and chi-square
tests showed that LHD response rates did not vary
(at the p<0.05 level) in terms of population size, county
sizes, and level of urbanity. Chi-square tests indicated
that local EMS agency response rates differed (at the
p<0.05 level) by county size; medium-sized counties in
California are under-represented in the survey results.
T-tests showed that hospital response rates varied
(at the p<0.05 level) by the median number of licensed
hospital beds, which suggests smaller hospitals may be
under-represented by survey results.
Key capabilities and functions
In this research, we characterize the response to the
simulated IED emergency by the number and type of re-
sponse capabilities (conceptualized as intermediate out-
comes in our epidemiologic exercise model; Figure 1,
letter c) activated by each agency and the role of each
agency (i.e., lead versus supporting). Figure 2 provides a
profile of response capabilities activated during the State-
wide Exercise. Two sets of capabilities are depicted: first,
a set of core capabilities activated across all agencies in
response to the exercise scenario; second, a set of
agency-specific capabilities, which were more common
among certain types of agencies. The average number of
capabilities reported was highest for local EMS agencies
within a LHD (mean: 9.8, range: 3–18), followed by
RDMHC (mean: 8.6, range: 1–17), hospitals (mean: 6.7,
range: 1–24), local EMS agencies (mean: 5.0, range: 2–7),
and LHDs (mean: 4.8, range: 1–10).
As Figure 2 shows, the core capabilities commonly
activated across all agencies consist of medical surge,
medical supplies management and distribution, critical
resource logistics and distribution, emergency operations
(See figure on previous page.)
Figure 2 Agency-specific Profiles of Activated Key Capabilities. Figure 2 shows a graphical profile of public health capabilities activated by
different agency types during the Statewide Exercise. For each of the graphs, the x-axis is numbered from 1 to 34, which are the numerical codes
for the key capabilities defined in the Department of Homeland Security’s Target Capabilities List, 2007 (see legend). The y-axis for each graph
indicates the percentage of the agency type that activated a given key capability. LHDs were treated as the “baseline”; its activated key
capabilities were sorted in descending order of frequency, and the other agency types were arranged accordingly. The asterisk (*) indicates key
capabilities reported by agencies other than LHDs that notably differed from LHDs. (Note: LEMSAs=local EMS agencies).
Table 1 Demographic Characteristics of Responding versus Non-Responding Agencies*
Responding Non-Responding
LHDs
(n=32)**
Local EMS Agencies
(n=42)***
Hospitals
(n=121)****
LHDs
(n=29)**
Local EMS
Agencies (n=16)***
Hospitals
(n=391)****
Median Population Size Served † 228,618 183,427 — 126,518 127,645 —
Median # Licensed Hospital Beds †† —— 166 —— 114
County Size }
Small 25% 31% — 24% 13% —
Medium 47% 38% — 52% 75% —
Large 28% 31% — 24% 13% —
Mean Level of Urbanity ¥ 1.5 1.52 — 1.41 1.38 —
* Since hospitals do not serve an entire county, we compare the median number of licensed hospital beds between responding and non-responding hospitals.
** LHDs representing 32 of 61 health jurisdictions responded to the post-exercise survey; 29 health jurisdictions are not represented.
*** 24 LEMSAS representing 42 counties responded to the post-exercise survey; 16 counties are not represented.
**** 466 general acute care hospitals in California were recruited for the survey, 121 of which responded. An additional 6 hospitals (3 federal hospitals and 3 acute
psychiatric hospitals) were included in the analysis, for a total of 127 hospitals.
† Based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2000.
{ Based on data from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, part of the California Health and Human Services Agency.
} Small LHD=population<50,000; Medium LHD=population 50,000-499,999; Large LHD=population ≥500,000.
¥ 1=Primarily Urban, 2=Urban/Rural Mix, 3=Primarily Rural.
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nition of indicators and warnings. In terms of agency-
specific capabilities, both types of local EMS agencies
and hospitals commonly activated emergency triage and
pre-hospital treatment. LHDs and local EMS agencies
within a LHD commonly activated emergency public in-
formation and warning. Lastly, RDMHC and local EMS
agencies within a LHD commonly activated responder
safety and health, environmental health, emergency pub-
lic safety and security, and citizen evacuation and shel-
ter-in-place.
For more detailed results on key capabilities com-
monly activated across agency types, see Additional file
1. Additional file 1: Table S2 in the appendix sum-
marizes the proportion of each agency type that acti-
vated each function during the exercise.
More subjectively, we describe the response by asking
whether agencies played a lead or supporting role during
the Statewide Exercise. Two-thirds (67%) of local EMS
agencies and local EMS agencies within a LHD stated
they played a lead role, while the majority of LHDs, hos-
pitals, and RDMHC indicated they played a supporting
role (61%, 76%, and 60%, respectively).
Challenges to inter-organizational communications and
information sharing
Looking specifically at one response capability, inter-
organizational information sharing, we characterize spe-
cific challenges, which if removed, would be expected to
improve final outcomes. The majority (56%) of respon-
dents’ comments referred to challenges related to the
complete or partial failure of communications equipment
or systems—specifically an internet-based hospital status
system which did not operate as expected, making it ne-
cessary for staff to collect data manually, repeatedly enter
information, or rely on a back-up system (e.g., radio, fax,
or runner) in order to receive or input information.
Results on the most significant communications challenge
encountered during the exercise, as well as challenges to
inter-organizational communications and information
sharing, are detailed in Additional file 2: Figure S3.
Discussion
This paper describes the application of a conceptual
framework to a Statewide Exercise as a systems-based
approach for studying public health emergency pre-
paredness and response. Capitalizing on a pre-existing
statewide operations-based exercise program, we were
able to access a large population of medical and health
agencies with minimal cost, and to characterize several
aspects of the public health and medical response to the
standardized emergency scenario. Our research findings
may provide an evidence-based starting point for pre-
paredness professionals’ dialogue about expected and
actual organizational roles, responsibilities, and resource
capacities within the public health system—an area that
needs improvement, according the literature and our
Steering Committee [1]. Additionally, we identify spe-
cific challenges to inter-organizational communications
and information sharing, which could provide specific
areas for intervention.
To our knowledge, this represents the first attempt to
develop and integrate a comprehensive research frame-
work into the conduct of a statewide operations-based
exercise. Attributes of this research framework that lend
it unique strengths include: (1) having sufficient
organizational units of analysis to test statistical hypoth-
eses, (2) the ability to apply epidemiologic concepts to
identify which public health system characteristics are
associated with positive health outcomes, and (3) the
ability to test hypotheses using randomized controlled
trials in which agencies are randomly allocated different
scenarios or injects during exercise play. Because this is
a novel approach to conducting exercise-based pre-
paredness research, in the following section, we describe
the lessons learned and challenges faced.
Challenges and opportunities
We were only able to partially operationalize our research
framework for this Statewide Exercise, describing the per-
turbation (exercise) and intermediate outcomes (response
activities) for different agencies within the public health
system. To fully leverage the Statewide Exercise for the
purpose of answering preparedness questions, a rando-
mized controlled trial should be conducted by randomly
allocating injects to agencies during exercise play. For ex-
ample, positive or negative injects can be randomly
assigned to agencies to measure exposure-response effects.
Conducting such a study would require organizational
buy-in from the exercise planning group and exercise par-
ticipants at an early stage of exercise design and would re-
quire researchers to be particularly attentive to factors
that might confound the exposure-response effects, in-
cluding the local implementation of the exercise scenario,
characteristics of the community served, and the distribu-
tion of public health responsibilities within a community.
Under the right conditions, the approach we have
described can be used to demonstrate variations in per-
formance outcomes, such as the speed, quality, and the
equitable provision of public health emergency services,
and ultimately, to identify factors associated with high per-
forming health departments.
In our study, we narrowly defined California’s public
health and medical preparedness system to include local
public health and EMS agencies, regional medical and
health disaster coordinators, and hospitals. Despite this
conservative definition, the system is complex, and
includes the 61 LHDs, 31 local EMS agencies, 58
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and 534 hospitals. In many organizations, emergency
preparedness functions are not a full-time or a primary
job responsibility, and individuals may fill the prepared-
ness role for multiple organizations within the same
county (e.g., EMS and public health agencies) or for
multiple counties. Additionally, operations centers are
often multi-use facilities, serving Department Operations
Centers and Regional Operations Centers (e.g., the
RDMHC may fill the regional disaster medical health
role in a facility shared with an EMS agency). The over-
lapping roles of preparedness professionals in this sys-
tem presented notable challenges in recruitment and
data analysis, underscoring the complexity of California’s
medical and health system and the subsequent challenge
of assessing differences across agency types, which are
not always clearly differentiated. Until the system com-
ponents are better understood, the use of a web-based
survey may not adequately capture how response func-
tions are organized and delivered within the public
health and medical system.
Although the integration of a research framework
within the Statewide Exercise program yielded advan-
tages of a larger sample size at a relatively low cost, there
are several limitations. First, although state agencies rec-
ommend that operational areas include certain common
features in their exercise design, each jurisdiction has
the autonomy to develop an exercise that best meets
their needs. Consequently, there is wide variation in the
characteristics of exercises conducted across the state.
To control for this, we limited our analysis to respon-
dents who performed an operations-based exercise using
the designated exercise scenario, on the specified day.
However, additional variation in the exercise design (in-
cluding the size, scope, and location of the emergency
scenario, and the level of exercise participation) could
not be controlled for. As a result, it is not clear how
much of the variability in the observed response is at-
tributable to differences in local implementation. To im-
prove the strength and validity of findings, we would
recommend additional standardization of future exercise
characteristics at the local level, as well as incorporating
random allocation of exercise injects to agencies sharing
similar characteristics in terms of organizational struc-
ture, community served, and public health responsibil-
ities. However, we acknowledge that this might be a
challenge, particularly because exercises of this scale in-
volve many agencies, and health departments may not
have control over important aspects of exercise planning
and implementation.
Second, because all operational areas were encouraged
to simultaneously conduct exercises on the same day, the
number of IED attacks “experienced” by the system in a
24-hours period, while theoretically possible, is not
realistic. Therefore, the communications issues experi-
enced by agencies could have been caused by or exacer-
bated by this artificiality. Nevertheless, the burden placed
on the system simulated in this scenario remains plaus-
ible. In a major earthquake scenario, it is possible there
would be more communication bandwidth used, and
more operational areas receiving, coordinating, and
sending mutual aid than occurred during this exercise.
Third, while we were able to recruit a large number of
hospitals (n=121), the overall hospital response rate was
26%, much lower than that of other recruited organiza-
tions. We found that small hospitals were particularly
under-represented. If the response functions activated
and communications challenges experienced vary by
hospital size, then our characterization of how hospitals
responded to the exercise scenario may be skewed. Sev-
eral factors may have contributed to the low hospital re-
sponse rate. First, because contact information for
hospital preparedness coordinators is not publicly avail-
able, we conducted recruitment through a third party.
Compared to governmental agencies, we had more lim-
ited control over hospital recruitment efforts—we were
not able to directly contact potential survey respondents
and to tailor recruitment efforts for non-responding hos-
pitals. Second, respondents were asked to identify a pri-
mary hospital affiliation; however, we found that some
respondents served as preparedness coordinators for en-
tire hospital systems. As a result of our assigning one
hospital per respondent, we are likely to have underre-
ported the number of hospitals that are actually repre-
sented in our sample.
Lastly, these research results only provide us with a
profile of capabilities and a characterization of communi-
cations challenges related to an IED scenario. We expect
that, given a different scenario, the capabilities activated
and communications challenges experienced might differ
in important ways. As part of a larger research program
at UC Berkeley, these variations will be documented and
analyzed in a wide range of exercise and real event sce-
narios. Future research will focus not only on whether
capabilities were activated, but also how central these ac-
tivities were to the agencies’ objectives.
Conclusions
By tapping into a pre-existing statewide operations-based
exercise program in California, we accessed a large num-
ber of medical and health agencies with minimal cost.
Using the 2010 Statewide Medical and Health Exercise in
California as an opportunity to develop our research
framework, we characterized several aspects of the public
health and medical system’s response to a standardized
emergency scenario. From a research perspective, this
study provides a conceptual framework for improving the
utility of exercise-based research. From a practitioner’s
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paredness professionals’ dialogue about expected and actual
organizational roles, responsibilities, and resource capacities
within the public health system. Additionally, the identifica-
tion of specific challenges to inter-organizational communi-
cations and information management offer specific areas
for intervention.
Endnotes
a Operations-based exercises can be of two types: func-
tional exercises and full-scale exercises. Functional exer-
cises test inter-agency emergency operation centers’
command, control, and communications. In full-scale
exercises, assets are deployed to the field.
b An operational area consists of a County and its pol-
itical subdivisions, such as cities and special districts.
c An IED scenario is one of 15 National Planning Scenar-
ios developed by the Department of Homeland Security in
effort to establish a standard range of capabilities and
resources necessary to respond to all potential high-impact
events facing U.S. communities, states, and the nation.
d Respondents who indicated their agency was a local
EMS agency represent a mixture of the four legally-
recognized types of agencies (i.e., local EMS agencies
that: operate within a LHD, have joint powers authority,
use county contractors, and operate within another de-
partment). However, we deferred to respondents’ agency
classification.
e Of 174 agencies, 23 were LHDs, 24 were local EMS
agencies, 121 were hospitals, 4 were state agencies, and
2 indicated “Other”. Twelve of 24 local EMS agencies
indicated their response represented both EMS and
LHD for their jurisdiction; therefore, they were double-
counted and contributed to the response rate for both
agencies. The 5 RDMHC were not included in the over-
all study response rate because they were from local
EMS agencies already accounted for.
f Three acute psychiatric hospitals and three federal hos-
pitals also responded to the survey. Although these
responses are not included in the response rate calculation,
they are included in the analysis of both research questions.
g Of 144 agencies, 18 were LHDs, 21 were local EMS
agencies, 103 were hospitals, 1 was a state agency, and 1
indicated “Other”. Twelve of 21 local EMS agencies indi-
cated their response represents both EMS and LHD for
their jurisdiction.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Supplementary Material. Summary of the
proportion of agencies activating key capabilities, by agency type.
Additional file 2: Figure S3. Overall responses to the question, “During
this exercise, what was your organization/agency’s most significant
communication challenge?” were coded and classified into themes,
categories and sub-categories. Multiple comments per respondent were
possible. Figure S3 shows the number and percentage of overall
comments (total number of statements=176) that indicated a particular
theme. An additional 15 respondents indicated “No communications
challenges” and 8 responses were strictly related to the exercise design,
as opposed to exercise play; these responses are not shown here.
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